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Dual Use Goods and the European 
Community: Problems and Prospects in 
Eliminating Internal Border Controls on 
Sensitive Productst 
INTRODUCTION 
In its continuing attempt to create a single, unified market 
throughout the European Community (EC or Community), the 
European Commission (Commission) has sought to eliminate inter-
nal border controls on dual use goods and technology, including 
nuclear materials.! "Dual use" goods are "any goods, related tech-
nologies, technical and scientific information, including know-how 
and engineering expertise, as well as certain nuclear products and 
technologies, which can be used for either civil or military pur-
poses."2 While efforts to create a single market for goods are pro-
ceeding welI,3 and many problems have been solved,4 the problem 
of eliminating internal border controls on dual use goods and tech-
nologies still remains.5 The Community, however, expects to elimi-
nate most, if not all, internal border controls on these goods by the 
end of March, 1993.6 
This Comment discusses the regulation proposed by the Commis-
t Copyright © 1993 Brian j. Leslie. 
1 EC: Commission to Appeal for Abolition of Export Controls of "Dual Use" Strategic Materials 
Within Single Market, AGENCE EUR., jan. 21,1992, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, Alleur 
File [hereinafter Commission to Appeal for Abolition of Export Controls]. 
2 Proposal for a Council Regulation (EEC) on the Control of Exports of Certain Dual-Use 
Goods and Technologies and of Certain Nuclear Products and Technologies, COM(92)317 
final at 11 [hereinafter Proposal on the Control of Exports of Certain Dual-Use Goods]. Dual 
use goods include products such as radar equipment, high-precision machine tools, chemical 
precursors which can be used to make chemical weapons, computers, and nuclear material. 
European Commission Seeks Curbs on Military-Civil Exports, Reuters Libr. Rep.,jan. 22, 1992, 
available in LEXIS, Europe Library, Alleur File. 
3 Amelia Torres, EC Single Market for Goods Is on the Right Track, Reuters Eur. Community 
Rep., jan. 13,1993, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, Alleur File. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. According to the General Mfairs Council, the gap in removing these border controls 
was supposed to be filled by the end of March, 1993. Id. 
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sion7 to eliminate internal border controls on dual use goods and 
technologies, It examines the problems and prospects of removing 
internal controls, as well as the difficulties the Commission faces in 
drafting a regulation that both eliminates internal controls and 
ensures that dual use goods are not exported to countries and 
groups that pose a threat to global stability. Part I provides the 
backdrop for the effort to control dual use goods. This part exam-
ines the growing threat posed by radical regimes and terrorists 
obtaining dual use technology and products and explores the EC's 
efforts to prevent diversion of dual use goods. Part II examines 
developments in the Community prior to the Commission's pro-
posal for the control of dual use goods and technologies. Part III 
analyzes the proposed regulation, setting out in detail the Commis-
sion's proposals to eliminate interior border controls while prevent-
ing the diversion of dual use technology and products. Part IV 
discusses the effectiveness of the proposed regulation. This Com-
ment concludes that while there is a compelling need to eliminate 
all internal border controls in order to complete the internal mar-
ket, the Community and the Commission must also ensure that the 
EC's external customs regulations are sufficiently stringent and uni-
form to prevent dual use goods from being exported to "trouble 
spots." 
1. THE QUEST FOR A POLICY ON DUAL USE 
GOODS AND TECHNOLOGY 
A. The Growing Threat of Radical Regimes and Terrorists Obtaining 
Dual Use Technology 
Preventing dual use goods and technology, particularly nuclear 
goods and technology, from falling into the hands of radical regimes 
and terrorist groups has long been a national policy of many mem-
bers of the international community. It is relatively easy to prevent 
the export of weapons and ordnance to particular countries.s Dual 
use goods, however, are much more difficult to control, because 
governments can always maintain that they are being exported for 
an innocent purpose.9 
7 See generaUy Proposal on the Control of Exports of Certain Dual-Use Goods, supra note 2. 
8 See Lucy Johnson, Europe: EC Must Take Lead on Arms Exports Controls, Say Experts, INTER 
PRESS SERVo Dec. 5, 1992, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, Alleur File. 
gId. 
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Several incidents in the past several years underscore the need for 
international cooperation in controlling exports of dual use goods 
and technology, including nuclear products. 1O In 1988, four scien-
tists charged that at least two tons of British plutonium, enough to 
make 400 nuclear warheads, were unaccounted for, and may have 
been diverted from civilian to military use.ll While not confirmed 
by the Central Electricity Generating Board, which controls nuclear 
power stations in the United Kingdom,12 the possibility that as much 
as two tons of plutonium could have been diverted from civilian to 
military use shows that the need for an international policy on dual 
use goods and technology is urgent. 
In the summer of 1991, Hungarian detectives broke up a major 
uranium smuggling ring when they discovered enriched uranium 
pellets stolen from a Rumanian nuclear reactor. 13 A few mon ths later, 
more enriched uranium pellets from the same Rumanian reactor 
were found in Italy, being sold by another group of Hungarians. 14 
In March 1992, German officials arrested two Russians for allegedly 
trying to sell enriched uranium for $1.1 million.15 In April 1992, 
Hungarian customs officers seized a shipment of hafnium shipped 
in from Russia. 16 The size of the shipment was enough to supply a 
nuclear industry-or a nuclear weapons program-for several 
years. 17 Finally, in July 1992, police in Austria arrested four Hungari-
ans, three Czechoslovaks, and an Austrian as they were about to sell 
1.3 kilograms of weapons-grade uranium to an Austrian middle-
man. ls It is thus imperative that the EC implement an export policy 
for dual use goods to ensure that, once internal barriers are elimi-
nated, these goods and technologies will not be exported to terror-
ists or other radical governments. 
While the end of the Cold War has seen the United States and 
Russia pledge to cut their nuclear forces by as much as two-thirds, 
a new and potentially more dangerous threat has replaced that of 
10 See, e.g., British Plutonium Allegedly Missing, CHI. TRlB., june 24.1988. at Cl2;jonathan 
Kaufman. Nuclear Entrepreneurs Cash In, CALGARY HERALD. july 12. 1992. available in LEXIS. 
Europe Library. AHeur File. 
11 British Plutonium Allegedly Missing, supra note 10, at C12. 
12Id. 
13 Kaufman. supra note 10. 
14 Id. 
15Id. 
16Id. Hafnium is a material used to absorb nuclear radiation. Id. 
17Id. 
18 Kaufman. supra note 10. 
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superpower nuclear confrontation. 19 A black market for nuclear 
material, nuclear weapons, and nuclear scientists is emerging, and 
government officials and intelligence analysts say this black market 
poses one of the greatest risks of the next decade.20 Authorities fear 
that materials from dismantled nuclear weapons, plus nuclear tech-
nology and nuclear specialists from eastern Europe and the former 
Soviet Union, could go on sale in the newly emerging nuclear black 
market.21 This flow of nuclear materials and knowledge could bolster 
the nuclear weapons programs of Iran and Syria, and increase the 
possibility that Libya, Algeria, or North Korea will develop a nuclear 
weapon.22 Furthermore, this new flow of brain-power and bomb--
making technology may provide terrorist organizations with a new, 
and even more devastating, weapon. 23 
Despite efforts by both Russia and the United States to retrain and 
find new occupations for weapons designers inside the former Soviet 
Union, it is only a matter of time before these scientists offer their 
services to the Middle East or to other countries interested in build-
ing nuclear weapons.24 Nuclear scientists in Russia are leaving their 
jobs and taking new ones at a rapid rate, indicating a dissatisfaction 
with working conditions in the field. 25 The turnover rate for such 
jobs in the former Soviet Union used to be less than 1 percent.26 
Some estimates now put the turnover rate at 20 to 30 percent.27 Yet, 
despite all of these reasons for growing concern, the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the agency designed to be the 
world's nuclear policeman, is practically helpless, as it finds itself 
burdened by Cold War structures and attitudes. 28 Critics of the IAEA 
believe it is incompetent to stop the growing proliferation of nuclear 
materials, technology, and know-how.29 
B. The European Community and Dual Use Exports 
To combat the threat of the exportation of dual use technology 
to undesirable countries, and to implement the single market fully, 
19Id. 
20Id. 
21Id. 
22Id. 
23Kaufman, supra note 10. 
24Id. 
25Id. 
26Id. 
27Id. 
28 Kaufman, supra note 10. 
29Id. 
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the Commission is working on a regulation that would eliminate 
intra-Community border controls, while at the same time strength-
ening controls over exports from the Community to third coun-
tries. 30 The Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community 
(EEC Treaty) allows Member States to maintain as many restrictions 
on weapons trade as they deem necessary.31 Dual use goods, however, 
are not considered weapons.32 Until recently, Member States im-
posed their own regulations on the export of dual use goods because 
the Community had not developed common rules on exports to-
ward third countries.33 As a result, national controls applied not only 
to exports to third countries, but also to exports to other Member 
States.34 
National policies vary tremendously from country to country, as 
do the penalties for violating the rules. 35 Some Member States im-
pose fines of £11,400,36 while others place no limits on the fines, or 
recommend imprisonment of up to seven years for violations.37 
Moreover, Member States differ as to which countries should receive 
the exports. For example, Germany does not export weapons to 
Saudi Arabia, whereas the United Kingdom considers the Saudis a 
key weapons market. 38 Differences on export licenses, the list of 
products subject to restrictions, and the list of countries of destina-
tion, also vary from Member State to Member State.39 As a result of 
all of these differences, a product refused for export in Britain, for 
example, may be allowed to be exported from another country, such 
as Portugal. 40 
II. DEVELOPMENTS PRIOR TO THE PROPOSED REGULATION 
To bring dual use goods and technologies into the single market, 
the Commission sought a regulation that would impose common 
30 See generally Proposal on the Control of Exports of Certain Dual-Use Goods, supra note 2. 
31 TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY [EEC TREATY] art. 223. 
32 Commission to Appeal for Abolition of Export Controls, supra note 1. 
33Torres, supra note 3. 
34 Andrew Hill, The European Market; Dual-Use Goods Expose EC Export Control Disparities, 
FIN. TiMES, Feb. 17, 1992, at 4. 
35Id. 
36 At an exchange rate of £1.52 to the dollar, this would be equivalent to a fine of $17,328. 
37 Hill, supra note 34, at 4. 
38 Johnson, supra note 8. 
39 EC: Report on Adoption of Measures on Exports of Dual Purpose Goods and Technologies, 
AGENCE EUR., Jan. 12, 1993, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, Alleur File. 
40 See Internal Market: Common System for Controlling "Sensitive Exports, "TRANSPORT EUR., 
July 31, 1992, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, Alleur File [hereinafter Common System for 
Controlling Sensitive Exports]. 
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export policies throughout the EC.4l The Commission wanted to 
abolish internal frontier controls on dual use goods by the end of 
1992.42 On July 17, 1992, the Commission proposed a framework 
agreement on export controls of dual use goods.43 The Commission 
based the proposal on the mutual recognition of current national 
regulations in Member States. The proposal was designed to elimi-
nate intra-EC frontier controls on dual use goods and technologies, 
including some nuclear products.44 
The Commission's proposal rested upon four elements. First, 
there had to be approval of common criteria to be fulfilled before 
an export license for export outside the EC would be granted.45 
Second, a precise list of products qualifYing as dual use goods had 
to be drawn Up.46 Third, a list of potential destination countries had 
to be drafted.47 Finally, there had to be a comprehensive list of 
cooperation procedures between the Member States.48 The Commis-
sion believed that, in addition to lifting the obstacles to a single 
market, removing internal frontier controls on these products would 
also help to strengthen controls over exports to third countries.49 
Although the Member States agreed that dual use goods would 
not be subject to internal border controls after January 1, 1993,50 
other difficulties have prevented the EC from adopting a policy on 
the export of these products.51 The European Parliament postponed 
a final vote on the regulation twice since January 1, 1993 because of 
problems in drafting the list of products to be considered as dual 
use goods and the list of countries to which export would be 
banned.52 The European Council is having difficulties drafting the 
41 See EC: Commission Proposes Framework Regulation Defining Export Regime for the Single 
Market, AGENCE EUR., July 17, 1992, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, Alleur File. 
42 Andrew Hill, Brussels Move on 'Dual-Use' Goods, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1992, at 2 [hereinafter 
Dual Use Goods]. 
43 Common System for Controlling Sensitive Exports, supra note 40. This framework agreement 
would eventually become the proposed regulation, after some modification. See id. 
44Id. 
45 Commission to Appeal for Abolition of Export Controls, supra note 1. 
46 Id. 
47Id. 
46 Id. 
49 EC: Commission Adopts Communication on "Dual-Use" Goods and Technology Within the 
Single Market, AGENCE EUR., Jan. 23, 1992, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, AHeur File. 
50 EC: Blockage of Dossiers on Trade Policy and "High Definition" Tv, AGENCE EUR., Dec. 23, 
1992, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, Alleur File. 
51 See EC: Postponement of Vote on Fuchs Report on Dual-Use Goods and Technologies, AGENCE 
EUR., Feb. 10, 1993, available in LEXIS, Europe library, Alleur File. 
52 Id.; EC: Vote on the Fuchs Report on Exports of Dual-Use Goods (Civilian and Military) Is 
Postponed Again, AGENCE EUR., Mar. 10, 1993, available inLEXIS, Europe library, AHeur File. 
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list of countries to be banned from receiving exports because of the 
political and diplomatic problems such a list may pose.53 Moreover, 
because of these political and diplomatic concerns, the European 
Parliament does not have the same powers as it has on other Com-
munity matters.54 
For the regulation to be effective, Member States must establish 
a "contract of truSt."55 Some Member States, however, notably Ger-
many and the United Kingdom, do not believe that other EC coun-
tries will be able to improve their export controls rapidly enough.56 
To resolve this problem, the Commission requires application of 
common criteria throughout the EC, a mechanism for coordinating 
licensing and enforcement, administrative cooperation between 
Member States, as well as establishing a common list of dual use 
goods subject to control and a list of proscribed destination coun-
tries.57 
III. THE COMMISSION'S PROPOSAL FOR THE CONTROL OF CERTAIN 
DUAL USE GoODS AND TECHNOLOGIES 
In its proposed regulation, the Commission recognized that intra-
EC export controls on dual use goods and technologies pose a 
problem for the completion of the single market. 58 Such internal 
frontier controls pose a problem because, in an effort to prevent 
these goods and technologies from being diverted for unauthorized 
uses, Member States apply controls on trade between Community 
countries as well as on trade to third countries.59 As a result, the 
Commission sought to break down internal barriers to trade in dual 
use goods, while at the same time preventing such products from 
being more easily exported to sensitive or proscribed locations.60 
The Commission concluded that an effective solution must be based 
on the following considerations: (1) export controls on such goods 
and technologies are subject to the EEC Treaty; (2) these products 
53 See EC: Parliament and Council Still Have Diverging Views of the Financial Perspectives, 
AGENCE EUR., Mar. 12, 1993, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, AHeur File [hereinafter 
Parliament and Council Still Have Diverging Views]. 
54 [d. 
55 Common System for Controlling Sensitive Exports, supra note 40. 
56 Dual Use Goods, supra note 42, at 2. 
57 [d. 
58 Proposal on the Control of Exports of Certain Dual-Use Goods, supra note 2, at 2. 
59 [d. "[T]o eliminate or minimise the risk of diversion, controls are generally applied on 
trade between the Member States themselves in addition to the controls which are applied 
on trade between the individual Member States and proscribed or sensitive destinations." /d. 
60 See id. 
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should move as freely between Member States as they do within each 
Member State; (3) an indispensable prerequisite for the elimination 
of internal controls is the establishment by all Member States of 
effective controls based on common standards; (4) the means used 
to eliminate internal frontier controls on dual use goods should not 
contravene the EEC Treaty; and (5) the controls applied on dual 
use goods and technologies under management such as the Coor-
dination Committee for Multilateral Export Controls Concerning 
Missiles (COCOM) and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, as 
well as foreign policy controls applied by the Member States, must 
be covered by the regulation.61 
Moreover, the Commission identified five requirements that must 
be met so that internal border controls on trade in dual use goods 
could be eliminated.62 First, the Member States must draw up a 
common list of dual use goods and technologies which are subject 
to contro1.63 Although individual Member States currently are work-
ing on this list, the Community must implement it at the Community 
level, so that all Member States execute the regulation in a uniform 
and direct way.64 Second, the Community must draft a common list 
of destinations, although the Commission did not address whether 
this list proscribes or permits exports to certain countries in its 
proposed regulation. 65 Third, the Community must institute com-
mon criteria for issuing export licenses for export from the Com-
munity.66 Fourth, there must be some mechanism to coordinate 
licensing and enforcement policies and procedures.67 Finally, there 
must be explicit procedures for administrative cooperation between 
the customs and licensing offices throughout the EC.68 While the 
proposed regulation has met most of these requirements, the lists 
of products subject to control and the list of destination countries 
are not complete yet.69 
The Commission recognized that controls on intra-Community 
trade only can be dismantled if all Member States have confidence 
in the other Member States' controls of exports to third countries.70 
61 ld. 
62 Proposal on the Control of Exports of Certain Dual-Use Goods, supra note 2, at 2. 
63 ld. 
64 ld. 
65 ld. at 3. 
66 ld. 
67 Proposal on the Control of Exports of Certain Dual-Use Goods, supra note 2, at 3. 
68 ld. 
69 Parliament and Council Still Have Diverging Views, supra note 53. 
70 Proposal on the Control of Exports of Certain Dual-Use Goods, supra note 2, at 3. 
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Thus, a regulation instituted at the Community level is necessary to 
achieve the twin objectives of eliminating internal controls on dual 
use goods and applying effective controls on dual use goods exports 
to third countries. 71 The proposed regulation provides the environ-
ment within which each Member State will apply controls on the 
exports of dual use goods to third countries.72 To ensure that the 
regulation will be applied effectively once adopted, the Commission 
has established a coordinating group with the tasks of examining 
any questions on the export of dual use goods, facilitating the 
execution of the regulation, and collecting all useful information 
for applying the regulation in the Member States.73 
The proposed regulation's purpose is to ensure that Member 
States apply the necessary controls, according to common standards, 
on exports or re-exports from the Community of certain dual use 
goods and technologies and of certain nuclear products.74 To 
achieve this objective, the proposed regulation requires an authori-
zation for the export of any goods appearing on the common list of 
products subject to controp5 In addition, article 4 of the proposed 
regulation requires an export license for the export of a product 
not con tained in the common list of products, if the exporter knows, 
or has been informed by the government, that the goods to be 
exported will be used, in whole or in part, for developing, produc-
ing, maintaining, detecting, identifying, or disseminating any con-
ventional, chemical, biological, or nuclear weapon, or for develop-
ing, producing, maintaining, or storing any missile capable of 
delivering such a weapon.76 In other words, if the exporter or gov-
ernment becomes aware that any goods to be exported could be 
used for military purposes, the exporter must apply for an export 
71 Id. 
72 Id. at 4. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. at 11. 
7sProposai on the Control of Exports of Certain Dual-Use Goods, supra note 2, at 12. As 
noted above, this list has not been completed yet. See supra text accompanying note 69. 
76 Proposal on the Control of Exports of Certain Dual-Use Goods, supra note 2, at 12. Article 
4 provides: 
Id. 
An authorization shall be required for the export or re-export of any goods not listed 
in the complementary regulation provided for in Article 3 if the exporter is aware, 
or has been informed by his government, that the goods in question are, in their 
entirety or in part, intended for use in connection with the development, produc-
tion, maintenance, detection, identification or dissemination of conventional, chemi-
cal, biological or nuclear weapons and the development, production, maintenance 
or storage of missiles capable of delivering such weapons. 
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license and must comply with the requirements for getting an export 
license.77 
Aside from being able to prevent the export of goods not on the 
common list of controlled products, licensing authorities in the 
Member States also may prohibit, in their discretion, the export of 
products not covered by the common list. 78 The Commission in-
cluded article 5 in the proposed regulation to allow Member States 
to prevent the export of goods not listed on the common list where 
officials have reason to believe that the products could be used for 
a purpose incompatible with commitments to international agree-
ments.79 Thus, while creating a Community-wide system of controls 
on exporting dual use goods, the proposed regulation also vests 
each Member State with at least some authority to apply its own 
restraints, although the European Council can overrule a Member 
State's refusal to grant a license.8o 
The competent authorities81 of the Member State in which the 
exporter is established grant export authorizations.82 Once issued, 
an export license is valid in any EC country, no matter which country 
issued it.83 For example, a security export license granted by United 
Kingdom authorities to a British company would be valid in Greece 
77 See id. For a full discussion on the requirements for an export license, see infra text 
accompanying notes 101-08. 
78Id. at 13. Article 5 provides: 
Id. 
Notwithstanding Article 4, the competent authorities may prohibit the export or 
re-export of goods not listed in the complementary regulation provided for in Article 
3; they shall immediately so inform the Commission and the other Member States, 
who shall consider the matter. 
A decision on the repeal or continuation of this measure shall be taken by the 
Council on a proposal from the Commission. 
79 Proposal on the Control of Exports of Certain Dual-Use Goods, supra note 2, at 5. For 
example, if a Member State is a party to an international agreement banning exports to a 
third country, say, Libya, then that Member State has the authority to deny permission to 
export because of that international agreement. See Common System for ControUing Sensitive 
Exports, supra note 40. 
80 See Proposal on the Control of Exports of Certain Dual-Use Goods, supra note 2, at 13. 
81 "Competent Authorities" are defined in the proposed regulation as "the authorities in 
each Member State given responsibility for ensuring that this Regulation is implemented." Id. 
at 12. 
82Id. at 13. 
83Id. Article 6(1) states that "[aln export authorization shall be granted by the competent 
authorities in the Member State in which the exporter is established. The authorization shall 
be valid throughout the Community." Id. 
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or any other Member State.84 The license is valid, however, only if 
the exporter meets the requirements attached to it.85 
The proposed regulation requires that an exporter obtain an ex-
port license for each item to be exported.86 The competent authori-
ties in each Member State may, however, grant simplified formalities 
to exporters who request them.87 Member States may issue a general 
authorization for a particular type or category of dual use goods, as 
well as a general authorization for export to one or more third 
countries.88 In addition, general authorizations may be granted to 
an exporter who is exporting goods to countries which appear on a 
list to be drawn Up.89 While the Commission welcomes and encour-
ages such simplified procedures,9o article 7 (4) prohibits such sim-
plified procedures for a select list of goods.91 
To ensure uniform application of the regulation throughout the 
Community, the Commission drafted a list of common criteria that 
the licensing authorities in each Member State must consider.92 First, 
84 David Buchan, EC Export Proposal for Dual-Use Arms, FIN. TIMES, July 17, 1992, at 5. 
85 Proposal on the Control of Exports of Certain Dual-Use Goods, supra note 2, at 13. For 
a more complete discussion of these requirements, see infra text accompanying notes 101--08. 
86Proposal on the Control of Exports of Certain Dual-Use Goods, supra note 2, at 14. 
87Id. 
88Id. For example, if a British exporter sought to export microchips to the United States, 
British licensing authorities could grant a general authorization for the entire shipment, 
presumably because the risk that the microchips would be diverted to military use is much 
less when the exports are to the United States. See id. 
89Id. Presumably, this list would include only "friendly" countries, where there was little or 
no risk that the goods exported would fall into the wrong hands. See id. 
90 Proposal on the Control of Exports of Certain Dual-Use Goods, supra note 2, at 5. 
9lId. at 14. While th~ list is not yet complete, it does include cryptographic equipment, 
sound navigation systems for submarines, and super computers. Common System for Controlling 
Sensitive Exports, supra note 40. 
92Proposal on the Control of Exports of Certain Dual-Use Goods, supra note 2, at 14-15. 
Article 8 provides: 
In deciding whether to grant an export authorization the competent authorities shall 
have regard to the following criteria: 
(a) respect for the international commitments of the Member States of the Com-
munity, in particular the sanctions decreed by the Security Council of the United 
Nations, agreements on non-proliferation and other subjects, as well as other inter-
national obligations; 
(b) respect of human rights in the country of final destination; 
(c) the internal situation in the country of final destination, with reference to the 
existence of tensions or internal armed conflict; 
(d) the preservation of regional peace, security and stability; 
(e) the national security of the Member States and of territories whose external 
relations are the responsibility of a Member State as well as that of friendly and allied 
countries; 
(f) the behaviour of the buyer country with regard to the international community, 
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the competent authorities must take into account the international 
commitments of the Member States.93 In particular, the sanctions 
established by the United Nations Security Council and the Com-
munity, agreements on non-proliferation, and other international 
agreements are important considerations for each country's compe-
tent authorities.94 Next, respect for human rights in the country of 
final destination must be taken into account.95 In addition, the 
internal situation of the country to which the goods are being 
exported must be considered, including the existence of tensions or 
internal armed conflict.96 Member States must be conscious of the 
preservation of regional peace, security, and stability.97 Furthermore, 
the national security of the Member State and of territories under 
the control of the Member State, as well as territories under the 
control of friendly and allied countries must be examined.98 The 
behavior of the buyer country regarding the international commu-
nity, particularly its attitude on terrorism, the nature of its alliances, 
and respect for international law is also important.99 Finally, Member 
States must evaluate the existence of a risk that the products ex-
ported will be diverted within the buyer country or re-exported 
under undesirable conditions. lOo Thus, the criteria are designed to 
minimize the risk that dual use goods will be diverted or exported 
to proscribed countries, while at the same time preserving some 
autonomy for the Member States. lOl 
Exporters must comply with certain conditions before licensing 
officials grant an export license. They must fully disclose to the 
competent authorities in the Member State all information in their 
possession regarding an application for an export license. 102 An 
export license may be suspended or revoked by the issuing Member 
State if the competent authorities have sufficient reason to suspect 
Id. 
as regards in particular its attitude to terrorism, the nature of its alliances, and 
respect for international law; 
(g) the existence of a risk that the equipment will be diverted within the buyer 
country or re-exported under undesirable conditions. 
93Id. at 14. 
94Id. 
95Id. 
96 Proposal on the Control of Certain Dual-Use Goods, supra note 2, at 14. 
97Id. at 15. 
98Id. 
99Id. 
100 Proposal on the Control of Certain Dual-Use Goods, supra note 2, at 15. 
101 See generally id. 
102Id. at 15. 
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that the license was granted based on false information, or where 
the exporter has not fully disclosed all information.lo3 Moreover, the 
officials responsible for implementing this regulation may deter-
mine that customs formalities for exporting dual use goods may be 
completed only at certain customs offices, thus limiting the ports 
from which such goods may be shipped.104 
Appropriate documentation must support any export of dual use 
goods under the proposed regulation.105 The exporter must provide 
documents such as invoices, manifests and other dispatch and trans-
port documents.106 These documents must contain enough informa-
tion to identify with certainty the type, quantity, and weight of the 
goods, as well as the name and address of the exporter and the 
consignee.Io7 In addition, exporters must keep these documents for 
at least three years from the end of the calendar year in which the 
export took place.10S The exporter must produce these documents 
to the competent authorities upon request.I09 
Although the punitive measures are not described in the pro-
posed regulation, the Commission has given some guidance in this 
area as wellYo Under the regulation, each Member State shall de-
termine the penalties imposed for a violation of any provision of the 
regulation, or any national measure enacted to implement the regu-
lation.Ill These penalties must be "effective, proportionate, and dis-
suasive" in natureY2 
103 Id. 
104 Id. at 16. 
105Proposal on the Control of Exports of Certain Dual-Use Goods, supra note 2, at 17. 
Article 13(1) provides: 
Id. 
1. Any export or re-export transaction covered by this Regulation must be supported 
by appropriate documentation. In particular, commercial documents such as in-
voices, manifests and other dispatch and transport documents must contain 
sufficient information to allow the following to be identified with certainty: 
-the description of the goods; 
-the quantity and weight of the goods; 
-the name and address of the exporter, and of the consignee. 
106 Id. 
107Id. 
108 Id. at 18. 
109 Proposal on the Control of Certain Dual-Use Goods, supra note 2, at 18. 
110 See id. at 19. 
III Id. Article 18 states that "[e]ach Member State shall determine the penalties to be 
imposed in the event of breach of the provisions of this Regulation and, where appropriate, 
of any national measures relevant to its application; such penalties must be effective, propor-
tionate, and dissuasive." Id. 
112Id. 
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Finally, recognizing that immediate implementation of the regu-
lation would pose problems for those EC countries whose customs 
controls are more lax than others, the Commission allows a one-year 
transition period in which the Commission shall take additional 
implementing measures.113 This transitional period is designed to 
reduce the risk that dual use goods exported under the new regu-
lation will be diverted to undesirable locations.1l4 These transitional 
control measures, however, will not apply to intra-Community trade, 
and internal frontier controls on dual use products trade are to 
remain unhindered. ll5 Thus, the Commission has taken several im-
portant steps to insure that intra-EC trade in dual use goods will 
remain unhindered, while at the same time ensuring that exports 
to third countries must pass a rigorous export procedure in every 
Member State.1l6 
Despite these steps, as of September 6, 1993, the Member States 
still had not voted on the proposed regulation.!!7 The Community 
Ministers sent the proposed regulation to the European Parliament 
for an opinion, but the Parliament postponed the vote on the 
regulation at least four times.ns The Parliament refused to give its 
opinion on the proposed regulation because it has not received a 
list of products and countries to which exports of dual use goods 
and technologies would be permitted. ll9 Until some sort of resolu-
tion is passed, dual use goods and technologies will be exported 
from one Member State to another only if the exporter is satisfied 
that the end-user is legitimate and will not later forward the goods 
or technology to an undesired country or groUp.!20 Community 
sources identified four main problems of the proposed regulation: 
(1) the legal basis for the legislation; (2) the length of the transition 
period before the new regulation would take effect; (3) the proce-
dure to be followed in relation to products which are capable of 
dual use but which do not appear on a list of dual use goods; and 
113 Id. 
114Proposal on the Control of Certain Dual-Use Goods, supra note 2, at 19. 
115 Id. 
116 See generally text accompanying notes 72-116. 
117 See Belgium: Council Sends Dual Use Goods Proposal Back to COREPER, Reuters News 
Serv.,July 19, 1993, available in LEXIS, World Library, TXTWE File. 
118 Luxembourg: Ministers Give Parliament an Ultimatum on Dual Use Goods, Reuters News 
Serv., Apr. 27, 1993, available in LEXIS, World Library, TXTWE File. 
119 Amelia Torres, Belgium: Ministers Have Another Go On Dual Use Goods, No Deal Seen, 
Reuters News Serv.,June 11, 1993, available in LEXIS, World Library, TXTWE File. 
120 Belgium: GAC Unlikely to Progress Far on Dual Use Goods, Reuters News Serv., July 16, 
1993, available in LEXIS, World Library, TXTWE File. 
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(4) the need to avoid license-shopping. l2l As for the procedure to 
be followed regarding goods not on a dual use list but capable of 
either civilian or military use, it has been posited that a "blacklist" 
of countries could be drawn up, so that a country such as Libya, for 
example, might not be permitted to receive fertilizer or fertilizer 
manufacturing equipment.122 Whether the Member States will have 
the political nerve to create such a list remains to be seen. 
IV. EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PROPOSED REGULATION 
The effect of requiring an authorization for exporting dual use 
goods123 is so obvious little comment is necessary. Requiring export 
licenses allows Member States to track such exports and to control, 
to some extent, where dual use goods are exported. Requiring 
authorization for goods not listed on the common list of controlled 
products when it becomes known that the goods to be exported 
could be used for military purposes also permits the Member States 
to control where dual use products gO.124 These are important safe-
guards in preventing dual use goods from being diverted to pro-
scribed countries or groups. Moreover, allowing Member States 
some discretion in prohibiting the export of goods not listed on 
the common list of controlled products125 gives each country some 
autonomy in dealing with products which potentially could be used 
for military purposes.126 
Allowing for universal validity of export licenses throughout the 
Community serves the dual purpose of breaking down internal 
border controls and minimizing the risk of diversion of trade in dual 
use goodS.127 First, universal validation allows a British export com-
pany to obtain a license from the United Kingdom, and then ship 
goods from another EC country in which the goods may be 10-
cated.128 The British company would not have to fight the bureauc-
racy of the country in which the goods are located. Secondly, the 
Member State from which the goods will be shipped can be 
confident that the issuing country properly issued the license be-
121Id. 
122 Id. 
123 See Proposal on the Control of Exports of Certain Dual-Use Goods, supra note 2, at 12. 
124Id. 
125 See id. at 13. 
126 See id.; Commission to Appeal for Abolition of Export Controls, supra note 1. 
- 127 See Proposal on the Control of Exports of Certain Dual-Use Goods, supra note 2, at 13. 
128 See id. 
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cause all EC countries must apply the same criteria and comply with 
the same list of proscribed shipping destinations.129 
Requiring export authorization for each individual export trans-
action serves the important purpose of preventing exporters from 
lumping prohibited dual use goods together with goods permitted 
for export, thus evading the export requirements.130 At the same 
time, allowing Member States to apply simplified procedures for 
some dual use goods and third countries reduces the administrative 
burdens placed on Member States.131 Of course, such simplified 
procedures only should apply to certain goods, and to a limited 
number of third countries, most notably friendly and allied coun-
tries. 
The Commission designed the criteria for issuing export licenses 
to minimize the risk of diversion of dual use goods to proscribed 
destinations. Enacting these criteria at the Community level ensures 
uniform publication and direct application in all Member States.132 
Moreover, the language of article 8, which sets out the criteria, is 
mandatory in nature, rather than precatory, thus guaranteeing that 
all EC countries will apply the criteria in a uniform manner.133 
Requiring the Member States to take into account obligations under 
international agreements will prevent the EC countries from being 
sanctioned by the international community for violating such agree-
ments.134 Considering the human rights and the internal situation 
of the destination country will allow Community members to deter-
mine on a case by case basis whether it is in the best interests of the 
people of the destination country to allow the export of dual use 
goods, as well as to prevent exacerbating what already could be a 
tense or hostile situation, such as if the destination country is en-
gaged in internal armed conflict.135 Allowing Member States to take 
into account their national security interests will prevent the goods 
exported from being used against the Member States.136 Indeed, a 
129 See id. at 12, 14-15. 
130 See id. at 14. 
131 See id. 
132 Proposal on the Control of Certain Dual-Use Goods, supra note 2, at 2. 
133Id. at 14. The relevant language of article 8 states that "[iJn deciding whether to grant 
an export authorization, the competent authorities shall have regard for the following crite-
ria .... " Id. (emphasis added). For the full text of article 8, see supra note 92 and accompa-
nying text. 
134 See id. 
135 See id. 
136 See id. at 15. 
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recent report concluded that armed forces from EC countries on 
peace keeping missions with the United Nations are being fired on 
by weapons manufactured in the Community.137 
The Member States also must take into account the behavior of 
the country buying the goods, especially regarding the country's 
attitude toward terrorism and respect for international law.13s This 
standard will help to prevent dual use goods from being exported 
to those regimes that support and encourage terrorism and consis-
tently flout international law. 139 Finally, Member States must take 
into account the risk that the products exported will be diverted 
within the destination country or re-exported for a prohibited use.140 
This will further the objective of the regulation of avoiding deflec-
tion of trade. 141 
The proposed regulation also sets up a one-year transitional pe-
riod in which Member States may impose additional implementing 
procedures to reduce the risk of diversion of dual use goods. 142 This 
is an important safeguard to ensure that such goods are not ex-
ported to a prohibited country during the initial implementation 
period while some Member States' customs controls are not yet up 
to standard.143 This transitional period is designed to give each 
Community country enough time to adapt their customs controls to 
the dismantling of the EC's internal borders. 144 This is an important 
provision because not all Member States apply the same controls to 
exports outside the Community,145 and removing internal barriers 
will result in at least some adjusting by Member States.146 
Although the Commission has taken great steps toward abolishing 
internal border controls on dual use goods, while simultaneously 
strengthening controls on exports to third countries,147 more work 
is necessary. A comprehensive list of products subject to control 
must be drawn up if the Commission has any hope of enforcing this 
137 EC: Report on Implementation of EC Policy on Arms Exports, AGENCE EUR., Feb. 19, 1993, 
available in LEXIS, Europe Library, AHeur File [hereinafter Report on Implementation of EC 
Policy on Arms Exports). 
138 Proposal on the Control of Exports of Certain Dual-Use Goods, supra note 2, at 15. 
139 See id. 
14() See id. 
141 See id. at 8. 
142Id. at 19. 
143 Proposal on the Control of Exports of Certain Dual-Use Goods, supra note 2, at 19. 
144 Common System for Controlling Sensitive Exports, supra note 40. 
145 Dual Use Goods, supra note 42, at 2. 
146 See Proposal on the Control of Exports of Certain Dual-Use Goods, supra note 2, at 19. 
147 See generally id. 
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regulation. I48 It is particularly difficult to regulate trade in dual use 
goods because governments can always argue that the purpose of 
their export is strictly for civil use.149 Providing a comprehensive 
list of goods subject to control will eliminate this argument,I50 and 
ensure universal and consistent application of the regulation 
throughout the Community. In addition, a common list of either 
proscribed or permitted destinations is essential if this proposed 
regulation is to be more than an empty shell. I51 Community coun-
tries often differ in their opinions on which countries should receive 
sensitive exports. For example, Germany currently restricts arms 
sales to Saudi Arabia, while the United Kingdom views Saudi Arabia 
as a fertile market. I52 While diplomatic concerns make it probable 
that any list will be a "positive" one, comprising the permitted 
destination countries rather than a "negative" list of proscribed 
countries,I53 such a list is necessary to ensure consistent application 
of the regulation throughout the Community.I54 
In addition, the Commission must work with the Member States 
to strengthen the external borders in all EC countries. While often 
it is the less-developed members of the Community that get blamed 
for lax export controls,I55 even the more industrialized and devel-
oped nations of the EC are prone to loose enforcement of controls 
on exports to third countries. For example, the Churchill-Matrix 
affair, in which Iraq was provided with machine tools worth $93 
million and military equipment totaling $200 million between 1987 
and the invasion of Kuwait in 1990, recently tainted the United 
Kingdom.I56 Between 1986 and 1990, Germany exported dual use 
goods worth about $198 million to Iraq,157 Thus, it is apparent that 
the Commission must work to upgrade the external borders of all 
Member States, not merely the less developed ones. 
Greece, Portugal, and Belgium have been identified as the Com-
munity countries with the weakest customs controls. I58 The Commis-
148 See Common System for Controlling Sensitive Exports, supra note 40. 
149 See Johnson, supra note 8. 
150 See id. 
151 See Common System for Controlling Sensitive Exports, supra note 40. 
152Report Says EC Could Become Arms Exporters' Paradise, Reuters Eur. Community Rep., 
Dec. 4, 1992, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, AHeur File [hereinafter EC Could Become 
Arms Exporters' Paradise]. 
153 Common System for Controlling Sensitive Exports, supra note 40. 
154 See Proposal on the Control of Exports of Certain Dual-Use Goods, supra note 2, at 11. 
155 See Common System for Controlling Sensitive Exports, supra note 40. 
156 Report on Implementation of EC Policy on Arms Exports, supra note 137. 
157Id. 
158 EC Could Become Arms Exporters' Paradise, supra note 152. 
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sion must work with these countries to improve their customs con-
trols, or exporters simply will export goods from those countries 
rather than other countries.159 The Member States must work to-
gether, share information,160 and not favor exporters from their own 
countries, if exports on dual use goods are to be controlled. 
CONCLUSION 
As the Community works toward achieving a single, unified mar-
ket, the need to eliminate internal frontier controls on trade in dual 
use goods is compelling. Eliminating the internal export controls 
should not, however, be done without strengthening controls on 
exports to other countries at the same time. The Commission has 
done much to accomplish this objective in its proposed regulation. 
The regulation requires individual export authorizations for each 
transaction, provides common criteria to be applied uniformly by 
each Member State, requires full disclosure by exporters, requires 
supporting documentation, mandates that exporters retain these 
documents for three years, and allows a one-year transitional period 
for Member States to adjust to the removal of internal barriers, all 
of which act to strengthen external border controls on dual use 
goods exports. The Commission must, however, also produce a com-
mon list of products subject to control, as well as either a list of 
proscribed destinations or a list of permitted destinations. In addi-
tion, the Commission must work together with the Community 
countries to strengthen the customs controls of all EC nations, 
particularly the less developed countries, to prevent dual use goods 
from being exported to a prohibited country via a country with 
weaker export controls. 
Brian J Leslie 
159 See Johnson, supra note 8. 
160 See Proposal on the Control of Exports of Certain Dual-Use Goods, supra note 2, at 17. 
